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Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model †
By Daron Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky*
We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping 
generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination 
games under incomplete information about whether the other side 
consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may 
be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited. 
Conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the 
seeds of their own dissolution: Bayesian agents eventually conclude 
that the spiral likely started by mistake, and is thus uninformative of 
the opposing group’s type. The agents then experiment with a good 
action, restarting the cycle. (JEL D72, D74, D83, Z13)
Mutual benefits from trust and cooperation not withstanding, inter-group conflict 
is pervasive. In his study of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (2000) traces the 
origins of conflict as much to fear and distrust as to other factors such as greed and 
honor. He argues that the Peloponnesian War became inevitable precisely because 
each side saw war as inevitable and did not want to relinquish the first mover 
advantage to the other (see also Kagan 2004).1 This view of conflict, sometimes 
referred as the Hobbesian view or the spiral model, has a clear dynamic implica-
tion: if Group A’s actions look aggressive, Group B infers that Group A is likely to 
be aggressive and acts aggressively itself (e.g., Jervis 1976; Kydd 1997). Moreover, 
unless Group A can fully understand that Group B is acting aggressively purely in 
response to its own actions, it will take this response as evidence that Group B is 
aggressive. As a result, conflict spirals.
The ubiquity of “conflict spirals” throughout history provides prima facie support 
for this view. A leading example is ethnic conflict: Horowitz (2000, p. 187) argues 
“[t]he fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acqui-
sition of power as an end” and suggests that such fear of ethnic domination was the 
primary cause of the rise in ethnic violence following the withdrawal of colonial 
1 The fear motive for conflict is also referred to as the “Hobbesian trap” or the “security dilemma” (following 
Schelling 1960). It is modeled by, among others, Baliga and Sjöström (2004) and Chassang and Padro i Miquel 
(2010). On models of conflict spirals, different from the ones we discuss below, see also Fearon and Laitin (1996) 
and the references therein.
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powers. Horowitz (2000, p. 189, italics in original) also suggests “[t]he imminence 
of independence in Uganda aroused ‘fears of future ill-treatment’ along ethnic lines. 
In Kenya, it was ‘Kikuyu domination’ that was feared; in Zambia, ‘Bemba domina-
tion’; and in Mauritius, … [‘Hindu domination’] … Everywhere the word domina-
tion was heard. Everywhere it was equated with political control.”
More recent examples of such spirals are provided by conflicts in Northern Ireland, 
the Balkans, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza and the West Bank, and Turkey. For instance, many 
accounts of the dynamics of the Serbian-Croatian war emphasize Croatian fears from 
the aggressive posturing of Milosevic, which were instrumental in triggering more 
aggressive Croatian actions—including the adoption as the national symbol of the 
šahovnica, associated with the fascist pre-Yugoslavia Ustasha regime, and a variety 
of discriminatory policies toward the Serbian minority (e.g., Posen 1993).2 Another 
example comes from the recurrent Colombian civil wars fought between the Liberal 
and Conservative parties and their supporters starting in the early 1850s. After civil wars 
in 1851, 1854, 1859–1863, 1876, 1884–1885, 1895, and 1899–1902, conflict resumed 
again in the 1940s in part because of Conservative fears in the face of growing Liberal 
popularity that they would be permanently excluded from power. Triggered by the mur-
der of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the most notorious episode of civil conflict, 
La Violencia, erupted in 1948. The subsequent widespread agitation led by street mobs 
in Bogotá was in turn interpreted by the Conservatives as a move against them by the 
Liberals, leading to all-out civil war (Hartlyn 1988; Safford and Palacios 2002).3
This classical view of conflict and distrust is incomplete, however, because it only 
explains how conflict starts and not how it stops—even though most conflict spirals 
come to an end sooner or later. For example, sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland 
has ended starting with a cease-fire in 1994 ultimately leading to the Good Friday 
agreement in 1998; war and conflict between different ethnic and national groups 
in the Balkans have mostly ended; historical Franco-German distrust and animos-
ity has made way for vibrant trade and economic and diplomatic cooperation; and 
many bloody ethnic wars that seemed intractable after the end of World War II have 
abated dramatically over the past two decades. Even in Colombia, the cycle of wars 
gave way to durable peace brokered by a power-sharing agreement in 1957, which 
interestingly was led by some of the most hard-line leaders such as the Conservative 
Laureano Gómez. So rather than infinite conflict spirals—where conflict once initi-
ated never subsides—history for the most part looks like a series of conflict cycles, 
where even long periods of conflict eventually end.
This paper proposes a simple model of conflict spirals, and then shows that such spi-
rals contain the seeds of their own dissolution—thus accounting for not only the onset 
but also the end of conflict. The basic idea of our approach is simple: once Groups A 
and B get into a phase in which they are both acting aggressively, the likelihood that 
2 DellaVigna et al. (2011) provide further evidence highly suggestive of a conflict spiral in this context. They 
show that Croatians who received nationalistic radio broadcasts from the Serbian side were more nationalistic and 
more supportive of anti-Serbian actions. Kaplan et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent with a “cycle of violence” 
from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (but see also Jaeger and Paserman 2008).
3 Spiral effects might account not only for violent conflict between nations and ethnic groups, but also for distrust 
between groups and within organizations. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) document deep-rooted distrust 
among some nations, and show that it is associated with lower international trade and foreign direct investment, and 
Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2011) show a similar pattern for international business ventures. Kramer (1999) 
surveys a large social psychology literature on distrust in organizations.
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a conflict spiral has been triggered by mistake at some point increases over time. This 
implies that aggressive actions—which are at first informative about how aggressive 
the other side truly is—eventually become uninformative. Once this happens, one 
group will find it beneficial to experiment with cooperation and, unless the other group 
is truly aggressive, cooperation will resume—until the next conflict spiral begins.
Formally, our model features a coordination game between overlapping genera-
tions of (representatives of) two groups. The “bad” action in the coordination game 
may correspond to fighting or initiating other types of conflict, and is a best response 
to bad actions from the other party, while the “good” action is optimal when good 
actions are expected. Each side is uncertain about the type of their opponents, who 
may be—with small probability—“committed” to the bad action. The two distin-
guishing features of our approach are (i) noisy Bayesian updating, so that individu-
als (groups) understand that conflict may be initiated because of a misperception or 
unintended action; and (ii) “limited memory,” so that there is limited information 
about the exact sequence of events in the past, and when and for what reason conflict 
started is unknown. Both features are plausible in practice. Indeed, a widespread 
view in international relations is that misperceptions are both very common and of 
central importance for conflict spirals (Jervis 1976). Limited memory also plays 
an important role in our theory. Without it, one party would understand that the 
spiral was started by its own action being misperceived by the other side and would 
attempt to rectify this misperception. Such detailed understanding of the origins of 
conflict are often not possible; instead, participants have only limited understanding 
of exactly when and how conflict started. This feature is captured by our limited 
memory assumption (relaxations of which are discussed below).
These features together generate a distinctive pattern where, in the unique sequen-
tial equilibrium of this dynamic game, a spiral of distrust and conflict is sometimes 
initiated and persists, but must also endogenously come to an end. The first con-
tribution of our model is to show that because of limited information about the 
past, when the current generation sees conflict (but not how it came about), it often 
responds by choosing a bad action, perpetuating the spiral.4 The main contribution 
of our model is to show that such spirals of conflict eventually terminate: when an 
individual or group reasons that there have been “enough” chances for a conflict spi-
ral to have gotten started (call this number T ), they conclude that the likelihood that 
it started by mistake—rather than being started intentionally by a truly aggressive 
adversary—is sufficiently high, and they therefore experiment with the good action. 
In our baseline model, these two forces lead to a unique equilibrium which features 
a mixture of deterministic and stochastic cycles. In particular, a single misperceived 
action stochastically initiates a conflict spiral, which then concludes deterministi-
cally at the next time t that is a multiple of T.5
4 This necessity of some form of limited memory or information about past signals and actions for generating con-
flict spirals is quite general, but is not discussed in standard informal accounts of conflict spirals (e.g., Posen 1993).
5 We certainly do not claim that every possible model of conflict spirals leads to cycles. For example, Rohner, 
Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) develop a dynamic “Hobbesian model” of conflict where information about a group’s 
type accumulates over time, leading asymptotically to either permanent war or permanent peace. The key difference 
is that, because of limited memory, information does not accumulate in our model, so this “asymptotic learning” 
does not occur.
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Our model can be best described as a reputation model with limited records and 
overlapping generations, and it is, to our knowledge, the first such model in the lit-
erature. Liu and Skrzypacz (2013); Liu (2011); and Monte (2013) also study repu-
tation models with limited records, but their models do not generate deterministic 
cycles, and the mechanism for cycles is quite different from ours (for example, play-
ers in our model have no incentives to manipulate their reputations, since they are 
all short-lived). Studies of overlapping generations games include, among others, 
Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) and Bhaskar (1998), which present anti-folk theorems, 
and Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005); Lagunoff and Matsui (2004); and Kobayashi 
(2007); which provide folk theorems with limited memory and altruism across gen-
erations (a possibility we consider in the online Appendix). Anderlini, Gerardi, and 
Lagunoff (2010) present a model of equilibrium conflict cycles where each group 
is held below what its minmax payoff would be if it were a single decision-maker. 
Acemoglu and Jackson (2012) study a coordination game with overlapping genera-
tions and imperfect monitoring, and show how social norms change over time when 
“prominent” players can try to improve the social norm. Their model does not fea-
ture incomplete information about player types or deterministic cycles.
A central and distinguishing feature of our model is the uniqueness of equilibrium 
and the associated cycles, which are driven by the endogenously changing infor-
mation content of players’ actions. Pesendorfer (1995) also generates cycles with 
changing information content, but the logic of his model, which is based on signal-
ing, is completely different. Finally, as compared to reputation models where play-
ers’ types follow a Markov process (Mailath and Samuelson 2001; Phelan 2006; 
Wiseman 2008; Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson 2012), it is noteworthy that our 
model predicts cycles in an environment that is stationary and that is also a natural 
dynamic version of canonical conflict spiral models.6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our baseline 
model and main results, including a range of comparative statics. Section II extends 
our results to the case in which calendar time is unobserved, while Section III 
considers the case in which more signals about the past are available. Section IV 
concludes. Appendix A provides the proofs omitted from the text, and the online 
Appendix relaxes several additional simplifying assumptions adopted in the base-
line model.
I. Baseline Model
In this section, we present our baseline model, which formalizes in the simplest 
possible way how conflict spirals can form but cannot last forever when individuals 
are Bayesian and have limited information about the history of conflict.
6 Also somewhat related are repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which behavior fluctuates with 
the public history (see Green and Porter 1984; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986, 1990 for canonical analyses; 
and Yared 2010 for an application to cycles of war and peace), and stochastic games with perfect information in 
which behavior changes with the state (e.g., Alesina 1988; Baron 1996; Dixit, Grossman, and Gul 2000; Battaglini 
and Coate 2008; Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski 2011). These models differ from ours in that they do not 
have incomplete information about types, deterministic cycles or equilibrium uniqueness. Tirole (1996) studies a 
simplified model of imperfect public monitoring generating collective reputation, though again with no cycles or 
endogenously changing information content of actions.
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A. Model and Equilibrium Characterization
Two groups, Group A and Group B, interact over time t = 0, 1, 2, … . At 
every time t, there is one active player (“player t ” ) who takes a pair of actions 
 ( x t ,  y t ) ∈  { 0, 1 } ×  { 0, 1 } , where  x t = 1 and  y t = 1 are “good” (“honest,” “peace-
ful”) actions and  x t = 0 and  y t = 0 are “bad” (“cheating,” “aggressive”) actions; 
as will become clear,  x t is player t’s action toward player t − 1, and  y t is player t’s 
action toward player t + 1. In even periods the active player is a member of Group 
A, and in odd periods the active player is a member of Group B. A different player is 
active every period. A key assumption is that players observe very little about what 
happened in past periods: in particular, before player t takes her action, she observes 
only a  signal  ˜ y t−1 ∈  { 0, 1 } of player t − 1’s action toward her. This assumption 
captures the feature that agents may know that there is currently conflict without 
fully knowing when and how this was initiated in the past. We assume that  ˜  yt−1 is 
determined as
 Pr  ( ˜ y t−1 = 1 |  y t−1 = 1 ) = 1 − π
 Pr  ( ˜ y t−1 = 1 |  y t−1 = 0 ) = 0,
where π ∈  ( 0, 1 ) is the probability of a “misperception.”7 Thus, a good action 
sometimes leads to a bad signal, but a bad action never leads to a good signal (both 
this and the assumption that nothing from the past history beyond the last period is 
observed are later relaxed).
Each group consists either entirely of normal types or entirely of bad types. 
The probability that a group is bad (i.e., consists of bad types) is  μ 0 > 0. Playing 
 ( x t = 0,  y t = 0 ) is a dominant strategy for the bad type of player t.8 For t > 0, the 
normal type of player t has utility function
 u ( x t ,  ˜ y t−1 ) + u ( y t ,  x t+1 ) ,
so her overall payoff is the sum of her payoff against player t − 1 and her payoff 
against player t + 1.9 By writing payoffs as a function of the realized signal  ˜ y t−1 (rather than the action  y t−1 ), we are following the literature on dynamic games with 
7 There are several ways of interpreting the misperception probability π. Most simply, one group may literally 
misperceive the other’s action, or a group’s leaders may try to do one thing but mistakenly do another. An alterna-
tive assumption, which is mathematically identical, is that, even when a group’s type is normal, a fraction π of its 
members are extremists or “bad types” who always play 0; for example, they may be “provocateurs” who benefit 
from sending the groups into conflict (cf. Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Glaeser 2005; Baliga and Sjöström 2012).
8 This is equivalent to bad types perceiving the game as a prisoner’s dilemma rather than a coordination game 
(and is thus much weaker than a long-run player in a standard reputation-formation model having a dominant strat-
egy, which requires that she would rather face the worst possible action of her opponent every period than play a 
different action herself once).
9 Changing this utility function to  ( 1 − λ ) u ( x t ,  ˜ y t−1 ) + λu ( y t ,   x t+1 ) for λ ∈  ( 0, 1 ) would have no effect on the 
results or in fact on the expressions that follow.
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imperfect monitoring in ensuring that no additional information is obtained from 
realized payoffs.10 The normal type of player 0 has utility function u ( ˜ y 0 ,  x 1 ) .11
We assume that each “subgame” between neighboring players is a (sequential-
move) coordination game, and that  ( 1, 1 ) is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium as 
formally stated next.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Coordination Game with (1, 1) Pareto-Dominant):
 (i) u ( 1, 1 ) > u ( 0, 1 ) .
 (ii) u ( 0, 0 ) > u ( 1, 0 ) .
 (iii) u ( 1, 1 ) > u ( 0, 0 ) .
We also assume that the probability that a group is bad is below a certain threshold 
μ ∗ ∈  ( 0, 1 ) :
ASSUMPTION 2 (Favorable Prior Beliefs):
  μ 0 <  μ ∗ ≡ 1 −  1 _ 1 − π  
u ( 0, 0 ) − u ( 1, 0 ) 
  __
u ( 1, 1 ) − u ( 1, 0 ) .
Assumption 2 is equivalent to assuming that normal player 0, with belief  μ 0 , plays 
y 0 = 1 when she believes that player 1 plays  x 1 = 1 if and only if he is normal and 
sees signal  ˜ y 0 = 1.
We can now explain the logic of the model. Assumption 1 ensures that in any 
sequential equilibrium player t does indeed play  x t = 1 if and only if he is normal 
and sees signal  ˜ y t−1 = 1. In view of this, Assumption 2 implies that normal player 
0’s prior about the other group is sufficiently favorable that she plays  y 0 = 1.
Next, consider normal player 1. If he sees signal  ˜ y 0 = 1, then he knows the other 
group is normal—since bad types take the bad action, which never generates the 
good signal. In this case, his belief about the other group is even better than player 
0’s, so he plays  y 1 = 1 (in addition to playing  x 1 = 1).
But what if player 1 sees signal  ˜ y 0 = 0? In this case, he clearly plays  x 1 = 0, and 
moreover, by Bayes’ rule, his posterior belief that the other group is bad rises to
  μ 1 =   μ 0  __  μ 0 +  ( 1 −  μ 0 ) π >  μ 0 ,
which follows in view of the fact that  ˜ y 0 = 0 may have resulted from the other side 
being bad (probability  μ 0 ), or from the bad signal following the good action when 
10 Little would change if payoffs depended directly on  y t−1 rather than  ˜ y t−1 (and were observed after choosing 
y t ), or conversely, if payoffs depended on  ˜ y t rather than  y t . In the former case if, in addition to changing the utility 
function, we also dropped the assumption that Pr ( ˜ y t−1 = 1 |  y t−1 = 0 ) = 0 (as we do in one of the extensions in the 
online Appendix), we would lose equilibrium uniqueness as in Bagwell (1995). We thank an anonymous referee 
for pointing this out.
11 Note that this makes action  x 0 irrelevant, so we ignore it (equivalently, assume that player 0 only chooses 
 y 0 ∈ {0, 1}).
1356 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2014
the other side is normal (probability  ( 1 −  μ 0 ) π). Now if  μ 1 is sufficiently high—in 
particular, if it is above the cutoff belief  μ ∗ —then player 1 plays  y 1 = 0 after seeing 
signal 0.12
Now suppose that up until time t normal players play y = 0 after seeing signal 0, 
and consider the problem of normal player t. Again, if she sees signal 1, she knows 
the other group is normal and plays  ( x t = 1,  y t = 1 ) . But if she sees signal 0, she 
knows that this could be due to a bad signal arriving at any time before t, because a 
single bad signal starts a spiral of bad actions. Thus, her posterior is
  μ t =   μ 0   ___    μ 0 +  ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) t ) ,
which follows since the probability of no bad signal arriving at any time before t, 
conditional on the other side being normal, is  ( 1 − π ) t , and thus the total probability 
of player t seeing  ˜ y t−1 = 0 is  μ 0 +  ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) t ) .
If  μ t is above the cutoff belief  μ ∗ , then player t again plays  y t = 0 after seeing 
signal 0. Crucially, note that  μ t is decreasing in t, and furthermore that  μ t →  μ 0 as 
t → ∞. Recall that  μ 0 <  μ ∗ . Thus, there is some first time T —given by equation (A1) in the Appendix—at which  μ T ≤  μ ∗ . And at this time, player T plays  y T = 1 
even if she sees signal 0. Thus, any spiral of bad actions that started before time T 
ends at T.
Finally, consider the problem of normal player T + 1. He knows that player T 
plays  y T = 1 if and only if she is normal. Thus, player T + 1 is in exactly the same 
situation as player 1, and play from period T + 1 on is exactly like play from period 
1 on. Hence, play is characterized by cycles of length T, in which a single bad signal 
at some time t starts a spiral of bad actions that lasts until the next multiple of T.
A central feature of the above argument is that it holds regardless of beliefs about 
future play. Consequently, equilibrium is unique up to one technicality: if  μ T exactly 
equals  μ ∗ , then cycles can be of length either T or T + 1, and this can eventually 
lead to “restarts” of cooperation occurring at a wide range of times. To avoid this 
possibility, we make the following genericity assumption on the parameters:
ASSUMPTION 3 (Genericity):  μ t ≠  μ ∗ for all t ∈ ℕ.
We now state our main result for the baseline model, establishing that there is a 
unique equilibrium and that it displays cycles. A similar cyclic equilibrium  structure 
will arise in all of the extensions studied later in the paper and in the online Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: Under Assumptions 1–3, the baseline model has a unique sequen-
tial equilibrium. It has the following properties:
 (i) At every time t ≠ 0 mod T, normal player t plays good actions 
 ( x t = 1,  y t = 1 ) if she gets the good signal  ˜ y t−1 = 1, and plays bad actions 
 ( x t = 0,  y t = 0 ) if she gets the bad signal  ˜ y t−1 = 0.
12 We do not assume that  μ 1 >  μ ∗ . But if  μ 1 <  μ ∗ , then the conflict “cycle” that emerges is the trivial cycle where 
cooperation always restarts immediately after a misperception.
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 (ii) At every time t = 0 mod T, normal player t plays the good action  x t = 1 
toward player t − 1 if and only if she gets the good signal  ˜ y t−1 = 1, but plays 
the good action  y t = 1 toward player t + 1 regardless of her signal.
 (iii) Bad players always play bad actions  ( x t = 0,  y t = 0 ) .
It is straightforward to turn the above discussion into a proof of Proposition 1, and 
we omit this formal proof (which may be found in an earlier version of the paper).
The unique equilibrium described in Proposition 1 has several features that we 
believe are both interesting from a modeling perspective and suggestive of real-
world cycles of conflict and distrust. First, the proposition implies that conflict 
cycles have both stochastic and deterministic elements: conflict spirals start with 
random misperceptions, but end at pre-determined dates where conflict becomes 
uninformative. Second, the probability of the groups experiencing conflict increases 
over time, as they get more and more chances to accidentally trigger a conflict spiral. 
Third, a group’s posterior belief that the other group is bad conditional on observing 
conflict decreases over time, as conflict becomes relatively more likely to have been 
triggered by mistake. Fourth, “restarts” of cooperation occur when this posterior 
drops below the threshold belief  μ ∗ needed to sustain cooperation—this happens 
when a group becomes sufficiently optimistic about the other group’s type that it 
is worth experimenting with the good action. Fifth, as noted in the introduction, 
limited memory plays an important role in our model: when they are in the midst 
of a conflict spiral, the groups do not know when the spiral began or who started it. 
In particular, if a group could somehow learn that they had started the conflict (i.e., 
that they acted at the first period t for which  ˜ y t = 0), then they would realize that 
the conflict is completely uninformative about the other group’s type, and would 
therefore restart cooperation. Though uncertainty about who started a conflict is a 
necessary factor for spirals in our model, we show in Section III that such uncer-
tainty arises even if each group observes signals about a series of actions from the 
past (but not the entire past history).13
B. Interpretation and Discussion
A central application of our model is to civil and international wars. Consider, 
for example, two groups (or two countries) that repeatedly face the potential for 
conflict. For each potential conflict, the groups sequentially choose between two 
actions, one of which corresponds to aggression or war. The “security dilemma,” 
or the “Hobbesian trap,” suggests a coordination game form in which a group or 
country likes taking the aggressive action if and only if the other side is aggres-
sive. In our overlapping-generations setup, this exactly corresponds to parts 1–2 of 
Assumption 1, implying that aggression is a best response to the belief that the other 
13 More generally, in our model a player who assesses that the other group is more likely to be bad after observ-
ing conflict also assesses that the other group is more likely to have started the current conflict spiral. Thus, leaders 
who are more confident that the other group started the conflict tend to fight, while leaders unsure who started the 
conflict are peaceful.
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side has been aggressive so far or is expected to be aggressive in the future.14 Part 3 
of Assumption 1 then implies that both sides are better off without such aggression.15
It is also useful to return to the two central features of our approach emphasized in 
the introduction, misperceptions and limited memory, in this context. It is certainly 
plausible that non-aggressive acts are sometimes viewed as aggressive by the other 
party or that, as pointed out in footnote 7, some aggressive elements within normal 
groups can instigate conflict even when the group itself is normal or non-aggressive. 
Our limited memory assumption, positing that the past history of signals is not fully 
observed (especially in the less extreme form used in Section III), is also reason-
able in this context. Even though we all have access to history books, it is difficult 
to ascertain and agree on how and exactly when a given conflict started, and indeed 
disagreement over “who started it” appears to be a pervasive feature of conflict. In 
Section III, we also point out that even if certain key, symbolic events are always 
remembered, lack of full memory of all past events leads to similar dynamics.
C. Comparative Statics and Welfare
We next provide comparative statics on the average duration of conflict and results 
on social welfare (when the probability of a misperception π is small), which are 
both of interest in and of themselves and useful for building intuition about the 
mechanics of the model.
By a conflict spiral, we mean a sequence of consecutive periods t with outcome 
( ˜ y t = 0,  x t+1 = 0 ) .16 The average duration of conflict is then the expected average 
length of a conflict spiral, conditional on both groups being normal. Formally, let 
 l m be the length of the mth conflict spiral for a given sample path. The average dura-
tion of conflict is
 E [   lim 
M→∞
 
  1 _ 
M
 ∑  
m=1
 
M
 l m ] ,
where the expectation is taken over sample paths, assuming both groups are normal. 
The focus on both groups being normal is natural: when at least one group is bad 
there is conflict in almost every period (i.e., in every period except possibly for mul-
tiples of T ), so in this case the average duration of conflict is not very interesting.
14 Jervis (1976) and Baliga and Sjöström (2004) also model conflict as a coordination game rather than, in 
particular, a prisoner’s dilemma. We do not think there is a “right” answer as to whether conflict should be mod-
eled as a coordination game or a prisoner’s dilemma, and believe that both approaches can be useful (for example, 
Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2010) consider a prisoner’s dilemma-like game), although we do think the standard 
Schelling/Hobbes story describes a coordination game. If the stage game in our model were a prisoner’s dilemma 
rather than a coordination game, the only equilibrium would be “Always Defect.”
15 One might argue that our baseline model would better capture the “first-mover advantage” aspect of war or 
conflict if we allowed player t’s payoff from choosing war after getting the peaceful signal from player t − 1 to 
differ from her payoff from choosing war prior to player t + 1’s playing peace; that is, if we allowed a player’s 
payoff to depend on whether she moves first or second in a given conflict. Our results would not be affected by this 
generalization so long as each potential conflict remains a coordination game (i.e., a player always wants to match 
her opponent’s action or signal, regardless of whether she moves first or second).
16 The term “conflict spiral” may imply an explicit escalation of conflict over time. Though there is a limited type 
of escalation in the baseline model— since in every conflict spiral between normal groups, the first period of conflict 
consists of a misperceived good action followed by a genuine bad action— there is no literal increase in the severity 
of conflict. We show how this can be incorporated into our model in the online Appendix.
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Our comparative static results are as follows: First, the average duration of conflict 
is greater when u ( 0, 0 ) is higher, u ( 1, 0 ) is lower, or u ( 1, 1 ) is lower, as all of these 
changes make experimenting with the good action less appealing (i.e., they decrease 
μ ∗ ) and thus increase T (the time when cooperation is restarted) without affecting 
the probability of the onset of conflict. Second, the average duration of conflict is 
greater when the prior probability of the bad type is higher, as this makes players 
more pessimistic about the other group (i.e., increases  μ t for all t ) and thus increases 
T—again without affecting the probability of the onset of conflict. Finally, increas-
ing the misperception probability π has an ambiguous affect on the average duration 
of conflict. On the one hand, when π is higher, a bad signal is less informative about 
the opposing group’s type, making players more optimistic (decreasing  μ t ), and thus 
decreasing T and the average duration of conflict. This effect is quite intuitive: when 
the intent behind aggressive actions is less ambiguous, it takes  longer to rebuild trust 
after an apparently aggressive action. On the other hand, increasing π also mechani-
cally makes miscoordination more likely when the other group is good, which 
decreases  μ ∗ and thus increases T and the average duration of conflict, and also makes 
it more likely that conflict begins earlier within each cycle, which also increases the 
average duration of conflict.17 Summarizing, we have the following result:
PROPOSITION 2: The average duration of conflict is increasing in u ( 0, 0 ) , decreas-
ing in u ( 1, 0 ) , decreasing in u ( 1, 1 ) , increasing in the prior probability of the bad 
type  μ 0 , and ambiguous in the misperception probability π.
Another object of interest is expected social welfare, averaged across all players 
(which roughly corresponds to the long-run fraction of periods spent in conflict). 
An interesting observation here is that expected social welfare when both groups are 
normal is bounded away from the efficient level 2u ( 1, 1 ) , even as the probability of 
a misperception π goes to 0. Thus, not only do some players receive payoff less than 
2u ( 1, 1 ) for all π > 0 (which is immediate), but the fraction of players who get less 
than this amount does not vanish as π → 0. The intuition is that while, as π → 0, 
the probability of a conflict spiral starting each period goes to 0, the expected length 
of a conflict spiral conditional on its starting goes to infinity. This is because when 
π is small conflict is very informative and it therefore takes a long time for coopera-
tion to restart after a misperception. This result is in stark contrast to what would 
happen in a static setting, where, as π → 0, the players could coordinate on the good 
outcome with probability approaching 1.18
In contrast, expected social welfare when both groups are normal does converge 
to the efficient level 2u ( 1, 1 ) when both the probability of a misperception π and the 
prior probability that a group is bad  μ 0 go to 0 (regardless of the relative sizes of 
these probabilities). Thus, both the probability of accidental conflict and the fear of 
the other group’s true intentions must be small for efficiency to prevail. The intuition 
here can be seen from examining the formula for  μ t : if  μ 0 is vanishingly small, then 
17 Either effect can dominate. For example, an implication of Proposition 3 is that the average duration of con-
flict goes to infinity as π → 0. On the other hand, decreasing π by an amount that is small enough that T remains 
constant necessarily decreases the average duration of conflict.
18 More precisely, in the “static” (i.e., two-period) version of our model, when both groups are normal, the 
probability that both players play 1 converges to 1 and payoffs converge to the full information payoffs as π → 0.
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any positive probability of conflict 1 −  ( 1 − π ) t is large enough that a player who 
observes conflict will restart cooperation. Hence, the probability that conflict ever 
actually occurs in a given T -period cycle goes to 0 when both π and  μ 0 go to 0.
Formally, we have the following result, where social welfare is evaluated accord-
ing to the limit-of-means criterion (proof in the Appendix).19
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that both groups are normal. Then the following hold:
 (i) The limit of expected social welfare as π → 0 is less than the efficient level 
2u ( 1, 1 ) .
 (ii) For any sequence  ( π n ,  μ 0, n ) converging to  ( 0, 0 ) as n → ∞ (such that 
Assumptions 1–3 hold for all n), the limit of expected social welfare as 
n → ∞ equals the efficient level 2u ( 1, 1 ) .
II. Unobserved Calendar Time
One highly stylized aspect of the baseline model is the strict dependence of 
behavior on calendar time. This section shows that the key conclusion that limited 
memory leads to conflict cycles rather than infinite conflict spirals—along with the 
underlying reason why this is so—does not depend on this feature.
The most direct way of eliminating dependence on calendar time is assuming that 
players do not know calendar time: each player observes a signal  ˜ y t−1 of her prede-
cessor’s action and then chooses actions  ( x t ,  y t ) , without knowing t. This approach 
is intuitively appealing, but it introduces the somewhat delicate issue of what play-
ers believe about calendar time when they enter the game. Here, we simply assume 
that players have an “improper uniform prior” about calendar time, in that they take 
the probability of observing signal  ˜ y t−1 to equal the long-run fraction of periods in 
which the signal equals  ˜ y t−1 .20 Player 0, however, is assumed to know calendar time (e.g., she can infer this from the fact that she does not observe a signal).
In such a model, normal players play  y t = 1 in response to  ˜ y t−1 = 1, as they know 
the other group is normal after observing  ˜ y t−1 = 1. There can be no equilibrium 
in which normal players play  y t = 0 in response to  ˜ y t−1 = 0 with probability 1. 
To see why, suppose that there were such an equilibrium. Then  ˜ y t−1 = 0 would be 
observed almost surely in the long run. But then, by Assumption 2, a normal player 
would believe that the opposing group is bad with probability  μ 0 <  μ ∗ after observ-
ing  ˜ y t−1 = 0 and would therefore play  y t = 1. Notably, this is precisely the reason 
why conflict spirals must eventually come to an end in the baseline model.
To characterize the equilibrium, suppose that in response to  ˜ y t−1 = 0 normal 
players play  y t = 0 with some probability p ∈  [ 0, 1 ] and play  y t = 1 with prob-
ability 1 − p. Then, when both groups are good, the long-run fraction of periods in 
which  ˜ y t−1 = 0 —denoted by q —is given by q = π +  ( 1 − π ) qp, or
 q =  π __ 
1 −  ( 1 − π ) p .
19 That is, if player t’s payoff is  u t , social welfare is defined to be li m N→∞   1 _ N  ∑ t=0 N  u t .20 See Liu and Skrzypacz (2013) for a rigorous foundation of this approach.
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This expression follows because if there is a misperception then  ˜ y t−1 = 0 with prob-
ability 1, while if there is not a misperception then  ˜ y t−1 = 0 with probability qp.
Now a normal player’s assessment of the probability that the other group is bad 
after observing  ˜ y t−1 = 0 is given by
 μ =   μ 0  __  μ 0 +  ( 1 −  μ 0 ) q.
For her to be indifferent between playing  y t = 0 and  y t = 1, it must be that μ =  μ ∗ , or
 q =  q ∗ ≡   μ 0  _ 
1 −  μ 0  
1 −  μ ∗  _ μ ∗  .
This holds if and only if
 p =  p ∗ ≡   q 
∗ − π _  q ∗ ( 1 − π ) .
Summarizing, we have the following result:21
PROPOSITION 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the model with an improper uniform 
prior over calendar time has a unique symmetric sequential equilibrium. It has the 
following properties:
 (i) Normal player 0 plays the good action  y 0 = 1 toward player 1.
 (ii) At every time t > 0, normal player t plays good actions  ( x t = 1,  y t = 1 ) if 
she gets the good signal  ˜ y t−1 = 1. If she gets the bad signal  ˜ y t−1 = 0, she 
plays the bad action  x t = 0 toward player t − 1 and plays the good action 
y t = 1 toward player t + 1 with probability 1 −  p ∗ .
 (iii) Bad players always play bad actions  ( x t = 0,  y t = 0 ) .
Thus, even when calendar time is not observed, our model generates cycles. 
Instead of the deterministic restarts of cooperation of the baseline model (which 
obviously cannot occur when calendar time is not observed), there is now a constant 
probability of restarting cooperation every period. But the fundamental reason why 
cycles must occur is the same: if conflict spirals lasted forever, they would be unin-
formative in the long run, just as in the baseline model. Consequently, cooperation 
must restart at some point, and because there is no possibility of conditioning on 
calendar time in the present model, cooperation restarts stochastically as a result of 
mixed strategies.
21 Here, a symmetric equilibrium is one in which all normal players (except for player 0 ) use the same strategy. 
Restring to symmetric equilibrium is without loss of generality if, in addition to being unable to condition on cal-
endar time, players are unable to condition on their own names.
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III. More Information About the Past
Another stylized aspect of the baseline model is the assumption that players 
observe a signal of only the most recent action  y t−1 and get no information about 
any earlier actions. Though this simple information structure allows us to explicitly 
characterize equilibrium and show that it features “restarts” of cooperation every 
T periods, it is not necessary for our main intuition for cycling. This section shows 
that when players observe the previous K signals, for any integer K, there are still 
restarts of cooperation (though not necessarily at regular intervals); in particular, 
we show that there are still infinitely many times t at which a normal player plays 
the good action  x t = 1 even if she observes K bad signals, and that this occurs for 
essentially the same reason as in the baseline model. Also, the event that player 
t observes K bad signals always occurs with positive probability, in particular with 
probability at least  π K .
Formally, let us modify the baseline model by supposing that players observe the 
previous K signals, for some fixed integer K. That is, before choosing her action, 
player t observes  ( ˜ y t−K ,  ˜ y t− ( K−1 ) , … ,  ˜ y t−1 ) , where this vector is truncated if t < K. 
Player t’s utility function is still given by u ( x t ,  ˜ y t−1 ) + u ( y t ,  x t+1 ) , exactly as in the 
baseline model.
PROPOSITION 5: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in any sequential equilibrium of 
the model where players observe the last K signals, there are infinitely many times 
t at which normal player t plays the good action  y t = 1 toward player t + 1 with 
positive probability when she observes all bad signals (i.e., when  ˜  yt−k = 0 for all 
k ∈  { 1, … , K } ).
Proposition 5 and its proof show that our main intuition for cycling goes through 
when players observe any number of past signals, not just one. However, when 
K > 1, cycling is no longer regular (i.e., there is no longer a restart of cooperation 
every T periods), and explicitly characterizing equilibrium seems very challenging.22
A final remark on observing more information about the past: In the context of 
war or ethnic conflict, it is sometimes argued that grievances from the distant past 
can be a salient source of conflict and distrust (e.g., massacres or desecration of 
holy sites). Proposition 5 can be modified to allow for this possibility. Suppose that 
every instance of conflict (i.e., every time that  ˜ y t = 0 or  x t = 0) leads to a lasting 
grievance for the opposing group with some probability. If players forget earlier 
grievances but always remember the exact timing of their group’s last  ˜  K grievances 
for some (potentially arbitrarily large but finite)  ˜  K , no matter how long ago these 
originated, then the same argument leading to Proposition 5 (in the Appendix) 
implies that there are again infinitely many times at which normal players restart 
cooperation even if the last K signals are all bad and they remember  ˜  K grievances. 
Consequently, conflict cycles emerge even when players can remember unbound-
edly distant grievances with positive probability.
22 The main difficulty is that when a player observes all bad signals, she has to update her beliefs about the last 
time a player restarted cooperation, which can be an intractable updating problem.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model of cycles of inter-group conflict and distrust 
based on the classical idea that conflict is often caused by distrust and misperceived 
aggression. In a dynamic context, a real or perceived aggression from one group 
makes it appear as innately aggressive to the other side, which in response acts more 
aggressively itself. When the first group cannot be sure whether this new aggression 
is a response to its own action or is due to the other side’s actually being aggressive, 
a spiral of aggression and conflict forms. But—as our model shows—such a spiral 
cannot last forever, because it eventually becomes almost certain that a conflict spi-
ral will have gotten started accidentally, at which point aggressive actions become 
completely uninformative of the other side’s type. At such a time, a group experi-
ments with cooperation, and trust is restored.
In the text, we showed that cycles of conflicts also arise when players cannot con-
dition on calendar time, when players observe multiple past outcomes of the groups’ 
relationship rather than just one, and when players can recall a finite number of 
“grievances” against the other group from arbitrarily far in the past. We consider three 
additional extensions of our baseline model in the online Appendix. Specifically, we 
show that the equilibrium of our model remains essentially unchanged when bad 
actions can also be misperceived as good, and that cycles persist (at least in some 
equilibrium) when players care about the welfare of future members of their own 
group. Finally, we also show that enriching the space of actions yields a model with 
both cycles of recurrent conflict (as in the baseline model) and cycles of escalating 
actions within each conflict episode.
Though our basic mechanism is simple, it is both different from existing explana-
tions for cyclic behavior in dynamic games and, we believe, potentially relevant for 
understanding why seemingly intractable conflicts ultimately end, and why cooper-
ation and conciliation often follow periods of distrust. For example, in the context of 
the La Violencia episode in Colombia already discussed in the introduction, Hartlyn 
(1988) emphasizes that “learning” by both parties was crucial to the ending of the 
conflict and the onset of peace. Hartlyn puts special stress on learning that the two 
parties could cooperate, writing, “[t]he national political leadership ‘learned’ the 
value of conciliation and compromise” (p. 71) and “[t]he response by party leaders 
built upon historical antecedents of compromise and the ‘political learning’ that 
stemmed from the combination of their earlier failed negotiations and their mutual 
horror and fear in the face of La Violencia” (p. 54).
Of course, serious empirical analysis is needed to determine whether the mecha-
nism we highlight—agents concluding that long-lasting conflicts are no longer 
informative about the true intentions of the other party—can indeed account for 
cycles of distrust and conflict in practice. There are also several possible areas for 
future research on the theoretical side. For example, it would be interesting to study 
the more complex reputational incentives, as well as the possibility of experimenta-
tion, that would emerge if players lived for more than one period, and also to con-
sider different ways in which players might learn about the history of conflict and 
cooperation between groups.
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Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Rearranging the definition of T, one can check that T is the least integer greater 
than log (  μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ) /log ( 1 − π ) , i.e.,
(A1)  T =  ⌈  log (  μ ∗ −  μ 0  _   μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  )   __  log ( 1 − π )  ⌉ .
This of course implies that  ( 1 − π ) T ≤   μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ≤  ( 1 − π ) T−1 , and therefore that 
li m π→0   ( 1 − π ) T =   μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  . Now, by Proposition 1, expected (limit-of-means) 
social welfare equals expected average social welfare within each T-period block. 
Consider for example the first block, consisting of periods 0 to T − 1. Continuing 
to let  u t be player t’s payoff, and assuming that both groups are normal, this equals
 1 _
T
  [ E [  u 0 +  u T−1 ] +  ∑ t=1 T−2 [  ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) t ) 2u ( 0, 0 ) 
 +  ( 1 − π ) t π ( u ( 1, 1 ) + u ( 1, 0 ) )  +  ( 1 − π ) t+1 2u ( 1, 1 ) ] ] .
We are interested in evaluating this expression as π → 0, which also implies (from 
(A1)) T → ∞. Thus, the expression of interest is
  lim 
π→0
 
   1 _
T
  [ E [  u 0 +  u T−1 ] +  ( T − 1 −  1 −  ( 1 − π ) T−1  _π ) 2u ( 0, 0 ) 
 +  ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) T−1 − π )  ( u ( 1, 1 ) + u ( 1, 0 ) ) +  ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) T  _π − 2 + π ) 2u ( 1, 1 ) ] 
=  lim 
π→0
 
  1 _
T
 [ E [  u 0 +  u T−1 ] +  ( T − 1 +  ( 1 − π ) T−1 ) 2u ( 0, 0 ) 
 +  ( 1 − ( 1 − π ) T−1 − π )  ( u ( 1, 1 ) + u ( 1, 0 ) ) 
 + 2 ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) T  _π − 2 + π ) (u ( 1, 1 ) − u ( 0, 0 ) ) ] 
= 2u ( 0, 0 ) + 2  lim 
π→0
 
  1 _
T
( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) T  π )  ( u ( 1, 1 ) − u ( 0, 0 ) ) ,
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where the second equality follows by state rearrangement, and the third one follows 
simply from canceling the terms that go to zero and noting that  ( T − 1 ) /T → 1 as 
T → ∞. The first part of the proposition then follows by observing that
 lim 
π→0
 
  1 _
T
 ( 1 −  ( 1 − π ) T   π ) =   lim π→0   ( 1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )    __Tπ ) =  lim π→0   ( 1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )    __−T log ( 1 − π )  ) 
 =  
1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0  _  μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  
  __ 
−log (  μ ∗ −  μ 0    μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ) < 1,
where the inequality holds for all  μ 0 > 0. Finally, the second part of the proposition 
follows by observing that
 lim 
n→∞
    1 _
T
 ( 1 −  ( 1 −  π n ) T   __ π n  ) =  lim n→∞    ( 1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0, n  _ μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0, n )     __T π n  ) =  lim n→∞    ( 1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0, n  _ μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0, n )     __−T log ( 1 −  π n )  ) 
 =  lim 
n→∞
    ( 1 −   μ ∗ −  μ 0, n  _ μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0, n )     _  −log (  μ ∗ −  μ 0, n  _ μ ∗ ( 1 −  μ 0, n )   ) ) = 1,
where the final equality uses  μ 0, n → 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Suppose not. Then there exists a time  
_ T such that at all times t ≥  _ T normal player 
t plays  y t = 0 after observing all bad signals. Suppose that both groups are nor-
mal, and observe that the probability that player  
_ T + K observes all bad signals 
is at least  π  K . In this event, all subsequent players play  y t = 0 and thus observe all 
bad signals. In the alternative event that player  
_ T + K observes at least one good 
signal, the probability that player  
_ T + 2K observes all bad signals is still at least 
 π K . Hence, the overall probability that player  _ T + 2K observes all bad signals is at 
least 1 −  ( 1 −  π K ) 2 . Now it is easy to see by induction on m that player  _ T + mK 
observes all bad signals with probability at least 1 −  ( 1 −  π K ) m . Hence, normal 
player  
_ T + mK ’s belief that the other group is bad when she observes all bad signals 
is at most
  ˜ μ  _ T+mK =   μ 0   ___    μ 0 +  ( 1 −  μ 0 )  ( 1 −  ( 1 −  π K ) m ) .
This belief converges to  μ 0 as m → ∞, so it follows from Assumption 2 that 
 ˜ μ   _ T+MK <  μ ∗ for some integer M. Therefore, normal player  _ T + MK would deviate 
to playing  y   _ T+MK = 1 after observing all bad signals, which yields a contradiction 
and establishes the desired result.
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